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Introduction 
In early June 2005 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting, 
India, Pakistan, and Iran were recommended for SCO “observer” status. Final SCO approval for 
the three countries was granted a month later at the SCO heads of state meeting held July 5-6, 
2005 in Astana, Kazakhstan.[1] This is a major step which accommodates each of the SCO 
member states’ interests and position of the SCO to further support a multi-polar world. This 
paper seeks to specifically address what is driving India’s and Pakistan’s interest in joining the 
SCO? In order to answer this question, one must have an understanding of the SCO and its 
members. The SCO is comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. During the SCO’s evolution, other countries in the region including Mongolia, Iran, 
India, Pakistan, and more recently the post-Taliban Afghan government, have expressed interest, 
to varying degrees, in participating in this emerging regional forum.[2]  
The SCO is an emerging regional organization in Central Asia, but during its short history it has 
largely remained an enigma. It has been characterized as a security organization, a regional 
forum, and an anti-terrorism coalition. Another common characterization of the SCO is as a 
Russian and Chinese led alliance created to counter U.S. hegemony. These explanations of the 
SCO have their shortfalls and provide little insight of the primary motivations and interests driving 
the SCO’s evolution. While analysis of this larger question is important, this paper seeks to 
examine the possibilities and implications of either India, Pakistan or both joining the SCO as full-
fledged members. In order to answer this paper’s research question, it is also important to 
understand the current geopolitical and geoeconomic relations between Central and South Asia. 
What bilateral relations currently exist between India/Pakistan and Russia, China, and the Central 
Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan)? What barriers or tensions 
may bar future full membership? Is India more likely to be offered entry over Pakistan or vice 
versa? Which SCO member states support or oppose India’s or Pakistan’s future membership 
and why? Finally, what do these answers to these questions tell us about the nature of the SCO 
itself? Is the SCO an alliance? Is it a regional economic forum? Or is it a modern day “concert” of 
Central Asia?  
To evaluate these questions this paper is organized into four sections. First, the paper will 
examine the history of the SCO, from its humble beginnings as the Shanghai Five to its modern 
day form. Second, the paper will explore how Indian and Pakistani pursued their Central Asian 
regional policies and bilateral relations with Russia, China, and the Central Asian Republics 
(CARs) after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[3] Third, it will consider how India and Pakistan 
have faired in pursuing bilateral ties with individual SCO members and examine the extent to 
which these ties have strengthened prospects for future membership in the SCO. Finally, the 
paper will concluded with an analysis of the likelihood of SCO full member status for India and/or 
Pakistan, as well as, what their membership might signify to the future direction of the SCO.  
The Development of the SCO  
The SCO, as regional security architecture, can be seen as a logical follow up to the 1990 
agreement between the former Soviet Union and China. Their goal was to ensure good 
neighborly ties, as well as to reduce the number of armed forces in the border regions of Central 
Asia. The independence of the Central Asian Republics in 1991 brought new sovereign nations 
into the regional discussions. The original Shanghai Agreement developed from two delegations; 
one group led by Russia representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while the 
other group was Chinese.[4]  
The Shanghai “Five” Forum  
The 1996 meeting in Shanghai and the 1997 meeting in Moscow laid the foundation of the 
modern SCO. Originally, the Shanghai Forum was formed to address a number of regional issues 
in Central Asia.[5] First, the Shanghai Forum was committed to fostering friendly relations and 
cooperation between its member states. Second, they wanted to promote mutual military trust 
between their countries. Finally, they wanted to reduce the number of armaments along the 
borders of their countries making it a 100-km demilitarized zone.[6]  
The 1998 meeting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan marked a dramatic departure from previous conferences where things were said, but 
never done. The vision for the meeting was to lay the foundation “to turn the border between the 
five countries into a frontier of genuinely equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation.”[7] 
Prior to the meeting one observer noted, “The five countries will come out as independent 
partners in the negotiations alliance.”[8] The meeting of the Group of Five was attended by the 
president of each country, with the exception of Russia, which was represented by Foreign 
Minister Primakov instead of President Yeltsin.[9] The primary purpose of the meeting was to 
signify the joint statements of the 1996 and 1997 meetings, including resolving Soviet era border 
security legacy issues and to make the organization “weightier and more solid.”[ 10] During the 
Cold War, Central Asia held a great concentration of opposing Soviet and Chinese forces. 
“However, in the new conditions the countries of the region have resolved to turn what was once 
the major zone of tension into a zone of security.”[11]  
The five countries also took a “principled position on the nuclear tests carried out by India and 
Pakistan.”[12] This unanimity demonstrated the SCO’s concern over issues which could lead to 
regional instability and “reflects their confidence and determination in nuclear non-proliferation 
and prevention of nuclear tests.”[13] In addition, the Chinese took the opportunity at this gathering 
to meet specifically with Kazakhstan to resolve border dispute issues between their countries.[14]  
The 1999 Shanghai Five meeting in Bishkek was significant in that the members began to talk 
about reviving the “silk road” economy. The new “silk road” involves the economic integration of 
the Central Asian Republics, Russia, and China through trade and investment, especially in the 
oil and gas sectors. However, China was already busy mapping out its plans for the SCO prior to 
September 11, 2001.Chinese President Jiang Zemin called on the member nations to continue 
their cooperation “to guarantee regional security, crack down on the forces of religious extremism 
and ethnic separatism, as well as combating international terrorist activities.”[15] Additionally, the 
post conference joint communiqué urged SCO members to develop further cooperation between 
ministries of defense and interior.[16]  
The 2000 meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan marked the first Shanghai Forum’s reaction to U.S. 
foreign policy. The NATO war in Yugoslavia was conducted without UN Security Council approval. 
China and Russia, bitter by the war, used the joint communiqué to state the importance of 
maintaining UN authority, particularly that of the Security Council. As well as “calling for a more 
effective role for the UN in conflict resolution, the communiqué also condemned the use of human 
rights for undermining the national sovereignty of states.”[17] Furthermore, the joint communiqué 
called for the establishment of a counter-terrorism center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan “to jointly 
combat national separatism, international terrorism, and religious extremism,” as well as 
preventing trans-border activities.[18] The anti-terrorism center was planned to “serve as the legal 
basis to start substantial cooperation in security issues and offer a more effective means for the 
fledging organization to combat terrorism together.”[19] Additionally, Uzbekistan attended this 
conference as an observer and applied for SCO membership.  
The SCO’s Creation  
The sixth meeting of the Shanghai Five in 2001was preceded by several key meetings attended 
by the members’ general staffs and foreign ministers. The grouping of fi ve members[20] was 
gaining its legs as a regional forum and organization. Uzbekistan became a full member and the 
group became known as the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” This face lift was ushered in 
by a series of policy decisions and conventions. The communiqué on arms control reaffirmed the 
SCO’s support for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and opposition to the U.S. National 
Missile Defense (NMD) program, as well as declaring Central Asia as a nuclear free zone.[21] 
The attendees also came out in support of the UN charter and pledged noninterference in each 
others internal affairs.[22] The SCO also indicated that they wanted to start a dialogue with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum. The heads of state also agreed 
to speed up institutionalization of cooperation mechanisms in areas of border security, confidence 
building, anti-terrorist, separatist and extremist activities, economic cooperation, and 
social/cultural exchanges, as well as a mechanism for dispute resolution among SCO 
partners.[23] The main output of this conference was the “The Shanghai Convention on fighting 
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremisms.” The Convention’s twenty-one articles continued to focus 
the SCO on regional security issues, while downplaying any notion of the SCO as a military 
alliance.[24] According to Georgiy Bovt, at the SCO’s initial formation, its members considered 
“the Afghan regime their main adversary and planter of terrorism and narcotics.”[25]  
In the past the SCO’s agenda had been primarily driven by security concerns, including the 
reduction of state tensions over border disputes, and by providing for stability in the highly ethnic 
fragmented region. Economic coordination had not developed beyond existing bilateral ties. 
Economic cooperation was still taking a backseat to security concerns and occupied “a strictly 
marginal position in the work of the youthful forum.”[26] This can be attributed to Russia’s existing 
investments in the Central Asian states’ energy resource firms and distribution infrastructure 
mixed with its attempts to use the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Community to wield economic 
influence in the region.[27]  
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the SCO began to evolve more rapidly. The U.S. 
led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM brought U.S. forces to Central Asia. While the Chinese 
and Russians recognized the United States’ right to respond to the sources responsible for the 
terrorist attacks, the establishment of U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan raised 
concerns. The SCO was forced to hastily push forward the establishment of a planned anti-
terrorism center. In June 2002, the SCO signed the Agreement between the member states of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Regional Anti-terrorist structure. This agreement was 
significant as it called for a clear-cut legal framework “for the establishment at the regional level of 
practical interaction in the struggle against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”[28] In addition, 
the SCO regional anti-terror center was renamed the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS).  
At the May 2003 meeting in Moscow, the leaders reached a consensus on the architecture of the 
future institutional organization of the SCO. The most significant actions taken by the SCO heads 
of state was establishing an office of the SCO secretariat, which would be situated in Beijing, as 
well as the decision to launch a regional anti-terrorism center by January 1, 2004.[29] While both 
Russia and China have a huge stake in the future success of the SCO, the Chinese were clearly 
the big diplomatic winner in the short-term. Finalizing the “SCO Charter validates Beijing’s ‘new 
security concept’ of promoting multilateral approaches to regional security, as opposed to U.S.-
led bilateral alliances or other security relationships.”[30] The Moscow SCO summit also decided 
to move the Executive Committee of the SCO regional anti-terror center from Bishkek to 
Tashkent in Uzbekistan.[31] Furthermore, the SCO conducted its first joint exercise during August 
7-12, 2003.[32]  
Shortly after the meeting in Moscow, the SCO held a follow up economic cooperation and 
integration ministerial meeting in Beijing. The Prime Ministers settled on a budget for the 
organization’s secretariat and the Tashkent anti-terrorism center. The officials codified six 
additional documents toward the institutionalization of the SCO. The documents solidified multi-
lateral economic and trade cooperation, the 2004 SCO budget, and the “rules and regulations on 
salary and allowances for staff members of the permanent [SCO] body.”[33] In addition, other 
documents covered the “anti-terrorism institution and personnel arrangement, technical initiation 
of the SCO permanent body, and a joint communiqué of the consultation.”[34] An outside 
observer noted: “With the institutional arrangements and administrative functions taking shape, 
the group should be able to deal with events and threats it had previously been criticized as 
incapable of handling.”[35]  
With its institutional mechanisms in place, the SCO was ready to coordinate its activities with the 
Asian-Pacific region. The June 2004 meeting in Tashkent further solidified the SCO’s framework, 
including approving Mongolia as a SCO observer. In addition to discussing the security and 
stability in the region, including the remnants of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamic 
extremist groups, Russia put forth an initiative to create a SCO-Afghanistan contact group to 
revive the Afghan economy. The SCO members also signed an agreement outlining cooperation 
in the fight against illicit drug trading. Russian President Putin “emphasized the importance of the 
SCO countries’ participation in the implementation of the initiative to create external anti-drug 
security belts around Afghanistan.”[ 36] The heads of state also agreed to set up a SCO regional 
development fund, as well as plans to hold an economic forum.[37]  
The next SCO summit meeting was held July 2005 in Astana, Kazakhstan which had planned to 
“focus on the economy.”[38] Russian Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov indicated the SCO also plans 
to establish a comprehensive regional development fund and business council at the next summit 
meeting.[39] Lavrov indicated that the 2005 meeting may go a long way toward solving regional 
problems: “Last year’s security and stability initiatives are being implemented, and contacts are 
being established with other organizations.”[40] He further remarked that the “documents on 
cooperation with ASEAN and the CIS are being drafted, and the SCO has received an official 
observer status at the UN General Assembly. This creates new possibilities for the solution of 
regional problems.”[41]  
However, the 2005 summit produced one highly publicized communiqué. This SCO communiqué 
called for the United States to establish a time table for the redeployment of its forces from 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The SCO justification was reportedly based on the U.S. led anti-
terrorism coalition’s completion of the active military phase of operations in Afghanistan. The 
SCO permanent members recognized, even in their own assessment as to the impact of their 
organization as regional antiterrorist structure had marginal results, and that its influence over 
processes in Central Asia had been minimal due to the U.S. presence.[42]   
Others have speculated that Uzbek President Karimov was behind the general push for the anti-
U.S. declaration—specifically, as a singular response to U.S. criticism of the regime’s refusal to 
permit an international investigation into events in Andijon.[43] Moscow has backed Tashkent’s 
during its latest downturn in relations with the United States, but has also pursued its own 
interests by “incorporating in the declaration the paragraph about the timeframe for the US bases' 
stay in Central Asia. This can be seen as responding to Washington for the tough stance 
espoused by US-backed Georgia on the withdrawal of Russian bases from its territory.”[44] 
Though the Russians have now seemed to have distanced themselves from calling on the United 
States to establish a time-table for removing its troops from its Central Asian airbases.  
Russian President Putin commented that there was “nothing out of the ordinary” by the SCO 
seeking a requested time table. Further, he highlighted that the SCO in pursuit of its anti-terrorism 
agenda did not need to establish SCO military bases and that in practical terms Russia 
considered military issues to be a part of the CIS CSTO purview.[45] Sergey Prokhodko, a Putin 
presidential aide when asked if the subject of withdrawing U.S. forces had come up during the G-
8 Summit in Scotland replied: “no. The question is of strictly applied nature.”[46] Others suggest 
that this SCO proclamation is empty because besides the rhetorical value, the United States 
seems to be the only country able to effectively maintain some semblance of stability in the region. 
The basic problem for the Central Asian states is that they “are incapable of resolving their own 
geopolitical fate without the patronage—including military—of stronger powers.”[47] Furthermore, 
Russia lacks the capability to and unwilling to let the United States be replaced by China, which 
has its own issues to commit its resources toward.[48]  
Others regional reactions were mixed. Muhiddin “Kabiri said that the leaders of the SCO states 
considered the USA's presence as one of the factors for ‘colour revolutions’ on post-Soviet 
territory.”[49] The Kyrgyz foreign minister recognized the past benefits of the U.S. presence in the 
region. Although, she pointed out that the duration of the anti-terrorist coalition's military bases in 
the SCO countries in Central Asia would be “directly connected with changes in the situation in 
Afghanistan.”[50]  
India’s and Pakistan’s Initial Foreign Policies and Strategic Incentives 
toward Central Asia (1991-2000)  
In order to understand what is driving India’s and Pakistan’s interests in joining the SCO, it is 
important to understand how they view their regional interests in Central Asia, as well as their 
relations with the SCO members. Historically, Central and South Asia were linked until the 
Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva came under Russian control during the mid nineteenth century. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, changes to the regional political map have once 
again led to speculation as to whether past historical ties will be revived and how far old patterns 
of relations will be restored. The current security environment in Central Asia presents both 
challenges and opportunities for India and Pakistan to influence regional affairs.[51] India and 
Pakistan tend to balance one another in their regional economic and security policies. However, 
one’s failure does not necessarily equate to future predictions of the others’ success.  
According to Juli A. MacDonald, “India and Pakistan squandered opportunities to develop closer 
relations with the new Central Asian states in the early 1990s.”[52] In the months leading up to 
September 11, 2001, both countries adjusted to fundamental changes in their strategic 
environment. India and Pakistan recognized that Central Asia was to play a critical role in their 
foreign policy calculations. India and Pakistan faced similar challenges regarding development of 
their regional policies in Central Asia. First, they are peer competitors in the region. Indian 
political elites have increasingly referred to Central Asia as part of “their ‘extended strategic 
neighborhood’ and as a region with which they share a range of strategic interests.”[53] While 
Pakistani political elites view Central Asia “important because it gives Pakistan what they refer to 
as ‘strategic depth’.”[54] Second, Central Asia is viewed “as an arena that is critical to larger 
geopolitical competitions and realignments” in the post-Cold War environment.[55] For India this 
aspect is based on perceived threats whether from Chinese encirclement or regional instability 
generated by the Afghan Taliban government. India also views the potential lack of access to a 
new east-west economic corridor—replacing the Cold War north-south orientation—as troubling. 
Finally, Central Asia represents an area for potential cooperation and conflict with the United 
States over state interests (e.g. countering Chinese influence or energy development and 
transportation routes). A third aspect of India’s and Pakistan’s thinking toward Central Asia 
concerns non-energy related economic interests and increased trade relations.[56] Finally, 
MacDonald contends that energy resources (e.g. oil, gas, and hydropower) and pipeline politics 
will be a major driving force in relations between Central and South Asia.[57]  
India  
India’s “interest in the Central Asia region comes from a mixture of politico-strategic concerns and, 
perhaps to a lesser extent, perceived commercial prospects.”[58] India’s initial reaction to the 
newly independent states of Central Asia, was like China’s, largely defensive in nature. The rapid 
growth of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey’s influence in Central Asia generated a growing “concern 
and resentment in Indian nationalist circles.”[59] The Indian political elites saw Pakistan’s rapid 
rapprochement in Central Asia as an attempt to establish a bloc of Islam states.[60] Anthony 
Hyman argues that some Indian political elites interpreted the independence of the Central Asian 
states “in an alarmist fashion, as a highly unwelcome strengthening of Pakistan’s regional 
position, with five potential new allies.”[61] Of particular note were the reports claiming Pakistan 
had acquired enriched uranium from Tajikistan and Kazakhstan while India’s own efforts to 
acquire the same material from Kyrgyzstan, under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards, had languished.[62] However, fear of a new Muslim fundamentalist belt was largely 
overplayed by Indian nationalists, media discussions, and reporting.  
In time, India’s government took a more sanguine view toward the Central Asia regimes. It came 
to an understanding “that none of the republics wanted the Islamic factor to count in their foreign 
relations, and that India quite as much as Pakistan could keep or gain further influence with these 
essentially secular-minded governments.”[63] Anita Inder Singh argues that India’s positive 
reengagement with the Central Asian states emerged due to new international and geopolitical 
realities. For Singh, India’s attempts to establish “good relations with them is a matter of 
pragmatism as India’s neighbors and rivals, Pakistan and China, are interested in the region.”[64] 
India was able to capitalize on its past ties with the Soviet Union to press its advantage in Central 
Asia. India’s prestige can largely be attributed to its culture, general goodwill, and “as an old and 
trusted friend the Soviet era.”[65]  
Today, India is turning to the SCO not for security purposes but for economic motivations. India’s 
interest in Central Asia and the SCO, by and large, is the result of its existing bilateral economic 
agenda. According to Singh, “India regards economic cooperation as the best way to counter 
Pakistan’s influence in Central Asia.”[66] The lynchpins of India’s Central Asian regional 
economic policies have been Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  
During the 1990s, “the actual volume of Indian trade with Central Asia remained modest.”[67] 
India was able to secure both economic and security agreements with Uzbekistan.[68] India was 
also able to increase cooperation with Kazakhstan in the areas of technology exchanges and 
participation in space programs associated with the Baikonur cosmodrome.[69] India also offered 
$5 million in trade credits to both Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Finally, India increased 
cooperation with Tajikistan despite its internal instability. However, it was set back in its attempts 
to open an embassy in Dushanbe. Overall India was received well by the newly independent 
Central Asia states, but retuned home with little to show for their efforts. A major constraint on 
India’s efforts was that it had little funds to back up the goodwill visits. The “cash-strapped Indian 
Government, its budget vetted by the International Monetary Fund, could offer only training 
programs and, in some cases, trade credits.”[70] Regardless of these government limitations, 
“Indian private companies were reportedly looking closely at Tajikistan’s investment potential in 
silver, pharmaceuticals, coal, granite, and leather goods for joint ventures.”[71]  
Despite its good standing and strong bilateral relationship with Russia, Ross H. Munro contends, 
“[i]n the final analysis, it was the overall weakness of India’s economy, and not just the budgetary 
straits the New Delhi government was in, that limited India’s ability to make an impact on the new 
republics.”[72] China was able to displace India by “offering cheaper and better quality consumer 
goods, including Hong Kong-designed and Chinese-made garments, to the five republics.”[73] A 
position China still maintains today.[74] By 1992, India’s economic ambitions were stymied, and 
its political elites became less concerned about the region.  
Pakistan  
Pakistan’s ambitions to form an Islamic bloc failed to materialize.[75] During the 1990s, Pakistan 
targeted the Central Asian states for better relations, but it did not yield the results initially sought. 
Pakistani political elites’ visions of forming “a Muslim security belt stretching from Turkey to 
Pakistan with Central Asia as the ‘buckle,’ to provide both ‘strategic depth’ and needed allies in 
her policy struggles over Afghanistan and Kashmir,” were quickly dashed.[76] Pakistan’s support 
for the Taliban is a lingering source of friction between the Central Asian states. Fear of a 
spillover into the Tajik civi l war and Taliban support from the IMU in Uzbekistan, only further 
isolated Pakistan from Central Asia.[77] In addition, the Central Asia states reestablished their 
ties with Russia as its main security partner in the region through the May 1992 CIS collective 
security agreement. During the 1990’s, Pakistan was forced to shift its focus in Central Asia to 
establishing bilateral economic and cultural ties and offering assistance on regional issues, such 
as counter narcotics.  
Pakistan’s initial forays into Central Asia emphasized the economic dimension of its foreign policy 
goals. The primary bilateral mechanism used by Pakistan was the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO),[78] which sought to create a common market for goods and services as well 
as to develop capital and financial markets between Muslim countries.[79] Pakistan wanted 
access to Central Asia’s energy resources and natural materials while offering to export textiles, 
machinery, and telecommunications equipment. The process was started with high-level 
delegation visits to Central Asia between November-December 1991. The result was $30 million 
in credit offers were tendered to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan “to establish joint 
ventures in cotton, textiles, garments, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, surgical instruments, 
telecommunications, and agro-industry.”[80] In the summer of 1992, Pakistan was also able to 
seal agreements with Uzbekistan “for the establishment of a satellite communications link, 
construction of highways, joint production of telecommunications equipment and the manufacture 
in Pakistan of rolling stock for Central Asian Railways.”[81]  
According to Dianne L. Smith, “Pakistan has had mixed success in bringing these bilateral 
agreements to fruition. They reflect the gap between intent and capability.”[82] Smith attributes 
these constraints to a lack of direct geographic access to the region, regional instability, 
Pakistan’s LOC infrastructure, and its lack of financial resources.[83] The final blow to Pakistan’s 
early economic aspirations in Central Asia was the establishment of the Shanghai Five in 1996, 
followed by the creation of the SCO in 2001.  
India’s and Pakistan’s 21st Century Foreign Policies and Strategic 
Incentives toward Central Asia and the SCO  
The SCO has severally limited Pakistan’s aspirations in Central Asia. The SCO has curtailed 
Pakistan’s attempts at establishing “strategic depth” by seeking new Islamic allies in a collective 
security arrangement. The SCO also has offered regional non-Islamic powers that are in a more 
favorable geographic position, such as Russia and China, the opportunity to exploit the regions’ 
energy resources. Joining the SCO may offer Pakistan the best channel to revisit its 1990s 
objectives and goals in Central Asia.  
India’s “Look East” foreign policy orientation seeks to enhance economic and military ties with 
countries in Southeast Asia. While it “Look West” policy, which is directed toward the Middle East 
and Central Asia, has not yet developed into a coherent strategy. India’s demand for energy 
resources is largely driven by three factors: the rapid growth of its economy; the status of its 
domestic energy sector; and its attempts at diversifying its oil and gas imports.[84] If India is 
serious about increasing its access to energy resources in Central Asia and the Middle East, it 
will have to come to a political arrangement with Pakistan.[85] However, this foreign policy track 
of economic interdependence may compete with India’s future regional goals and lingering 
security concerns.  
India’s 21st century ambition to be a global power has one major consequence. Its aspiration to 
“rise to a global status would be to leave Pakistan trailing behind as a minor regional power that 
could no longer threaten India's vital interests.”[86] Joining the SCO would build on India’s 
existing bilateral economic and military ties with the Central Asian states and Russia. Improving 
military logistics with Iran, Tajikistan,[87] Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan[88] and Uzbekistan[89] is 
critical to India’s strategic vision. Joining the SCO may also make establishing a permanent, 
stable relationship with China more likely.[90] However, the events of September 11, 2001 may 
impact India’s long-term regional calculus.[91]  
Post September 11th, India’s diplomatic charge into Central Asia has largely been driven by its 
future energy requirements.[92] Strategic repositioning also weighs in India’s security calculations 
since the Taliban government was ousted from Afghanistan.[93] According to Rahul Bedi, the 
United States’ continued presence in the Central Asian region and the Chinese-India nuclear 
rivalry are “also fueling New Delhi’s ‘forward’ Central Asian policy.”[94] Although “India remains 
powerless to engineer or overtly influence the ‘New Game,’ its size, military, and nuclear 
capability make it a not altogether insignificant part of the complex jigsaw” puzzle.[95]  
Russia fully supports India’s entry into the SCO as a full fledged member. Russia and India share 
a “broad congruence on a whole range of strategic issues. But it is the defense and military 
technical cooperation which is the lynchpin of the strategic partnership.”[96] Kazakhstan’s 
President Nazarbayev also has openly supported India’s inclusion in the SCO, as well as 
becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.[97] Nevertheless, India may be 
having second thoughts on joining the SCO with Russia and China as a “strategic triangle” 
promoting a multi-polar world. India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States may 
“likely put Delhi in an awkward situation if it did indeed join the SCO given the organization’s 
revised, albeit unstated, charter of containing Washington’s burgeoning influence in the 
region.”[98] New Delhi is also extremely cautious about joining any security forum, especially with 
China as a leading player, especially if China’s military and nuclear partner Pakistan is also a 
likely member.[99] A senior Indian diplomat commented that until “SCO membership rules are 
finalized we cannot assess whether joining it will be advantageous or not for India.”[100] The 
officials further indicated “that the key to India’s relations with the Central Asian Region depended 
largely on China’s response to the U.S. military presence in the region.”[101]  
Post September 11th, Pakistan has found a new ally in Central Asia and a strong supporter for its 
membership in the SCO. Uzbekistan seems ready to move past the Pakistani government’s 
former support for radical Islamic groups in Central Asia.[102] Security issues and increased 
bilateral economic cooperation were on the agenda during a recent meeting in Tashkent. 
Presidents Islom Karimov and Pervez Musharraf both see a common threat from extremism, 
terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trafficking. Both leaders want to destroy the root causes 
of terrorism. Economically, Uzbekistan is interested in gaining accesses to Pakistan’s major 
Indian Ocean ports of Karachi and Gwadar. Despite this latest goodwill, the specter of Islamic 
radicals who fled Uzbekistan and sought refuge in Pakistan remains a “delicate issue.”[103] One 
may speculate as to whether a new regional North-South axis is forming between Uzbekistan, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, all strong political and military allies of the U.S.’ Global War on 
Terrorism. If this is the case, Pakistan’s bid to become a member of the SCO may have strong 
implications on the overall SCO orientation, potentially creating a pro-U.S. support bloc. In this 
case, the Indian elites which have historically suspected an U.S.-Pakistan-China strategic triangle 
aimed at limiting India’s rise to a great power status might well pursue a counter policy by 
establishing an India-Iran-Tajikistan triangle. Regardless of myth or fact, one should expect a 
continued game of “one-upmanship” as India and Pakistan seek greater security and economic 
ties in Central Asia.  
The Debate and Implications for Adding New Members  
China has been very supportive of Pakistan’s entry into the SCO, which can also be seen as a 
counter balance to India. Pakistan’s interest in joining the SCO may have started out as a security 
interest against terrorism. However, many of the Central Asian regimes find Pakistan’s past pro-
Taliban policy unsettling. Lingering fears of Pakistani ISI support for radical Islamic-oriented 
movements may continue to be the main reason why the CARs would not support Pakistan’s 
entry into the SCO. Additionally, current Pakistani governmental support of U.S. foreign policy in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia may pose additional challenges to membership. Meanwhile it is 
also imperative for Pakistan to maintain friendly ties with Russia and strengthen their friendship 
with China, which are the two dominant players in the SCO. Russia is keenly aware of China’s 
preference toward Pakistan over India joining the SCO. Indeed, Moscow’s preference toward 
India versus Pakistan makes either country’s entry into the SCO less likely, so long as there is a 
balance of power between Russia and China within the SCO. However, if India joins the SCO first, 
Pakistan will mostly likely claim that India will use this to their advantage. Pakistan anticipates 
that India, as a SCO member, would cite Pakistan’s alleged support of terrorism and Islamic 
extremism in Kashmir to oppose their entry.  
Economic and political interests are India’s prime motivation for joining the SCO, as well as 
security interests in SCO membership. Two security issues confront India. First, the ongoing 
border disputes with China. Second, India is concerned over Islamic groupings with ties to 
Pakistani madrassahs, spilling over into Kashmir. Russia’s support for India’s inclusion is largely 
attributed to their past military and technical cooperation, as well as their desire to counterbalance 
a rising China. India has been politically neutral to Central Asia. Central Asia has not been a 
staple of Indian Foreign policy calculations. Economic access to the oil and gas sectors and 
commercial export markets of Central Asia make sense for India’s rapidly growing economy. India 
may still seek to counter Pakistan’s ambition by denying them “strategic depth.” In the end, the 
decision to add India or Pakistan to the SCO will be a telling indication as to whether it is Moscow 
or Beijing that has the political diplomatic mechanisms to control the orientation of the SCO.  
The implications of the SCO becoming a regional and global powerhouse should concern U.S. 
policy makers. A SCO expansion to include other regional states risks adding unsettled “frozen 
conflicts” into the harmony of the organization’s achievements in economic and security 
agreements. Adding new members also increases the risks of bringing the SCO in direct 
confrontation with U.S. foreign policy interests in Central Asia. With a unanimous requirement for 
accessions, the SCO will most likely wait to add new full-fledged members, with the exception of 
Mongolia, which is considered a Central Asian state. However, India, Pakistan, Iran, and even 
Afghanistan may be granted observer status in the interim to promote the SCO economic and 
regional security agenda. Although, prior to any agreement to add additional SCO members, 
short-term security and stability concerns will need to be addressed and will be the primary 
driving factor in selecting new members. Once these security issues are addressed the SCO can 
focus its agenda on achieving the long-term goal of economic integration required to launch a 
new “silk road.” Given the current state of play and alignment, there are two likely scenarios for 
SCO expansion in the south: Russia-China-Iran or Russia-China-India. Current Uzbekistan 
support for Pakistan may be limited to Uzbek President Karimov’s regional positioning and the 
continued instability in Afghanistan. However, the most dangerous scenario would be for a future 
SCO containing Russia, China, India, and Iran. Any SCO enlargement which adds additional 
nuclear powers could destabilize all of Central and South Asia. This event would further 
complicate U.S. foreign policy for decades to come, making the security and stability of the 
Caucasus and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that much more vital in U.S. strategic national 
interests.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, although full SCO membership for India, Pakistan and Iran may be a distant reality, 
the SCO should not be considered a defensive alliance directed against the U.S. at the present 
time.[104] By offering “observer” status to each country at the same time, the SCO members 
have taken a pragmatic approach toward promoting their interests by leveraging the existing good 
neighborly ties throughout the region. This step may reduce any tensions associated with offering 
membership to some and not others. All parties recognize the importance of regional cooperation 
and interdependence to meet the challenges of regional security, long-term economic 
cooperation, and increased cultural ties. Today, the SCO shows strong characteristics of 
economic and security interdependence, however, prior SCO annual meetings and resulting joint 
declarations do not represent more than a talk shop. The most significant tangible results of these 
meetings have been the significant bilateral economic arrangements worked out in side bar, 
state-to-state meetings. However, promoting regional security against the “three evils”—terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism—is the primary motivation for all SCO members.[105] Thus, the SCO 
in its current form should be, at most, narrowly considered a modern day “Concert” of Central 
Asia, even though the SCO did not act to halt the overthrow of the Akayev regime in Kyrgyzstan 
in April 2005.[106]  
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